This paper studies the e¤ect of country employment regulations on the formation of corporate groups in Europe. While employment regulations in some European countries impose substantial constraints on external labor markets, these regulations do not apply to internal labor markets of corporate groups. Using a comprehensive …rm-level dataset covering 15 West European countries, we study the strategic response of …rms to increased employment regulations. We document the presence of a speci…c mechanism through which regulations a¤ect corporate groups: internal labor markets. We …nd that the propensity of …rms to be a¢ liated with groups is larger where country regulations and industry turnover are jointly high. This result is especially strong for smaller …rms, which do not have their own internal labor market, and for a¢ liates of large and diversi…ed groups. We complement our …ndings with direct evidence on managerial mobility, and show that internal mobility becomes more likely than external mobility as country employment regulations increase.
Introduction
Classic works by Chandler (1962) and Penrose (1959) emphasize internal labor markets (ILM) as a central mechanism through which …rms can achieve sustained competitive advantage and growth. The present paper investigates how this mechanism drives the strategic response of …rms to increased country employment regulations. Consistent with the logic of transaction-cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) , we show that as transaction costs associated with using external labor markets rise, more of these transactions would take place inside corporate groups-collections of legally independent …rms (Le¤, 1978; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . Supporting Chandler and Penrose's view of the strategic importance of internal labor markets, we underscore the conditions under which they a¤ect …rm boundaries. Our empirical approach is to use the combined variation in country regulations and industry frequency of labor readjustment to test whether utilization of internal labor markets is an important mechanism through which country regulations a¤ect the organization decision of …rms. We contend that corporate group a¢ liates in West Europe have an advantage in redeploying labor because within-group coordination allows internal adjustment of labor in response to external shocks without dismissing employees and incurring employment regulation penalties for dismissals.
This advantage is further enhanced by a legal provision which exempts intra-group labor adjustments from country employment regulations.
Employment protection regulations comprise a set of legal rules, administrative procedures, and compensatory payouts that apply to employee dismissals. In contrast with unemployment bene…ts, which are funded through payroll taxes, employment protection regulations impose direct costs on the employer responsible for dismissals. 1 , 2 We identify the e¤ect of country regulations on corporate group a¢ liation by showing that a speci…c mechanism through which employment regulations a¤ect corporate group a¢ liation is present. To identify this mechanism we perform the following test. We examine how the di¤erence in the share of group a¢ liates between industries with high and low frequency of labor adjustments varies by country employment regulations. Consistent with the ILM mechanism, we expect this di¤erence to increase with the level of employment regulations.
Our di¤ erence-in-di¤ erence empirical strategy is thus to exploit exogenous country and industry conditions, and test whether country regulations have the strongest impact on group a¢ liation in industries where …rms, for exogenous reasons, adjust their labor force more frequently. Using data from the U.S., we rank industries according to their level of labor turnover in relatively regulation-free labor markets. We use the annual establishment-level employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to calculate average turnover rate for each industry. Then we rank the 15 West European countries in our sample according to the level of their employment regulations, using the OECD Employment Protection Index and as other measures from complementary sources. Our formal test is whether the di¤erence in group a¢ liates between high and low industry labor turnover is higher in countries with high employment regulations than in countries with low regulations.
There are three major challenges in identifying the e¤ect of country regulations on corporate group a¢ liation. We follow and explain how our methodology addresses each challenge.
First, a reverse causality argument implies that while groups may replace ine¢ cient external labor markets, they may also restrain the development of the institutions they mimic (Granovetter, 1995; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . Our focus on a speci…c mechanism through which regulations a¤ect a¢ liation substantially mitigates this concern. For instance, to argue reverse causality in our context, countries where the di¤erence in group 1 For example, in Spain, individual dismissal procedures require 30-day written notice with a statement of reasons for dismissal and a written noti…cation to the worker's representatives at the workplace. Upon dismissal, Spanish employees are entitled to severance pay equivalent to 33 days'salary for each year of service. Similarly, Austrian workers with more than 3 years of service are entitled to 8 weeks'notice and 6 months'salary as severance pay (OECD Employment Outlook, 2004). 2 There is a wide variation in the employment protection in our sample of West European countries. Greece, Spain, and France are countries with the strictest employment protection regulations, while Great Britain, Ireland, and Switzerland have the fewest restrictions on employee dismissals. a¢ liates between high-and low-turnover industries is large should also have higher employment regulations.
To our knowledge, there is no evidence suggesting this should be the case, especially in the speci…c context of European employment regulations. 3 Second, omitted or latent macro variables can be correlated with both employment regulations and group a¢ liation. By including industry and country …xed e¤ects, selecting an empirical setting where countries share a relatively similar level of economic development (and still have a considerable variation in employment protection policies), and focusing on industry-country interaction rather than "level"e¤ects, we substantially mitigate country unobserved heterogeneity concerns. Moreover, our rich …rm-level data allow us to investigate how the regulation-turnover e¤ect varies by di¤erent …rm subsamples, and perform additional tests based on the conditions under which the ILM mechanism should be especially prominent. Third, group a¢ liates are often privately held corporations, and due to intricate ownership arrangements (Faccio and Lang, 2001 ) they can be "relatively invisible" in some settings (Granovetter, 1995) . To mitigate the invisibility problem, we capitalize on the strict reporting requirements of the EU, where public and private …rms have to …le annual reports detailing ownership and …nancial information, to construct comprehensive ownership and control hierarchies for groups.
The European Union is an ideal environment for testing the ILM theory for three main reasons. First, EU countries exhibit a wide variation in employment regulations, but at the same time, they exist within a narrow range of economic development, such that we can focus on developed economies and substantially reduce cross-country heterogeneity. Second, EU countries share a clear and consistent de…nition of groups based on historical, institutional, and economic traditions. Lastly, employment regulations apply only to labor readjustments that use external markets, but not to ones that take place inside corporate groups. Under EU law, mobility of workers within a corporate group is not considered a "market transaction."This means that intra-group mobility is not subject to country labor-market regulations and a¢ liates can transfer employees to a di¤erent a¢ liate without incurring dismissal penalties set by employment protection regulations. The European Union Directive 96/71/EC sets out to facilitate movement of human capital within and across the Member States and allows group a¢ liates to "post workers to an establishment or to an undertaking owned by the group in the territory of a Member State"(O¢ cial Journal L 018, 01/21/1997 p. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . This provision, granted to group a¢ liates, allows unilateral transfer of employees among a¢ liates without having to dismiss and rehire each transfer and thereby not being subject to employment protection regulations. This legal provision provides a clear advantage to …rms that are a¢ liated with corporate groups.
While the legal exception formalizes the ‡exibility of worker reallocation within groups, it is important to emphasize that this provision is not a necessary condition for the ILM argument to hold. In the absence of the provision, corporate groups are still likely to hold an advantage over una¢ liated …rms in their ability to reallocate labor. Voluntary deployment is another way for groups to get around dismissal regulations. Since dismissal regulations do not apply for separations initiated by employees, voluntary basis of internal transfers 3 Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant institutional context of employment regulations. allows reallocations to be completed without costly dismissal penalties. Further, voluntary employee redeployments are facilitated by coordination within the group, in contrast to external labor market exchanges, where the burden of matching employees with jobs rests with the employee, which makes voluntary quits less likely. Thus, the advantage of ILMs for corporate groups is particularly strong in countries where employment regulations are high, and in industries where labor readjustments are frequent. Under those conditions, consistent with the Coasian perspective of …rm organization, corporate group a¢ liation should also be higher. This is the main point we make and test empirically in this paper.
Our …ndings strongly support the internal labor market mechanism. We …nd that the di¤erence in the share of group a¢ liates between industries with high and low labor turnover is signi…cantly larger in countries with high employment regulations than in countries with low regulations. The range of the e¤ect is large.
Moving from the lowest decile to the highest decile of country employment regulations increases the di¤erence in group a¢ liation between high-and low-turnover industries by 4.2 percentage points, or about 20 percent of sample average share of group a¢ liates. We con…rm the robustness of our results by using alternative measures of country regulations and industry labor mobility. The e¤ect is strongest when exploiting only variation in managerial mobility (rather than production workers), and for industries where tasks are less routine (that is, more worker discretion is required).
To further test our mechanism, we explore how the country-industry e¤ect varies by di¤erent …rm subsamples. We …nd patterns that are highly consistent with the ILM mechanism. The country-industry e¤ect is very strong when restricting the sample to small …rms, and is essentially zero when restricting the sample only to large …rms. This pattern is consistent with the theory, because large …rms have internal labor markets of their own (which we do not observe) that are not subject to employment regulations, similar to the internal labor markets of corporate groups. Thus, for large …rms we should not expect their group a¢ liation to be much a¤ected by country employment regulation. This is not the case for small …rms that do not have their own internal labor markets, and thus their group a¢ liation decision should be strongly mediated by employment regulations. Continuing this line of investigation, we also distinguish between a¢ liates of diversi…ed groups and a¢ liates of specialized groups. Theory predicts more active internal labor markets for more diverse groups, because such groups are more likely to be able to smooth employment ‡uctuations as industry-speci…c shocks arrive. Consistent with this theory, our results reveal stronger country-industry e¤ects when comparing standalone …rms to a¢ liated …rms of diverse groups than when comparing standalone …rms to a¢ liates of specialized groups. Lastly, we complement our …ndings with direct evidence on managerial mobility. Using information on mobility patterns of more than 250,000 managers of group a¢ liates between 2002 and 2007, we show that internal mobility becomes more likely than external mobility as country employment regulations increase.
Institutional Background

Labor Markets in Europe
In this section we provide background on the sources of variation in employment protection regulations across our sample countries. Our overview emphasizes sources of variations that stem from diverse traditions of labor-industry relations in each country that are not clearly related to the prevalence of corporate groups, thus mitigating reverse causality concerns.
Since the industrial revolution, the role of labor has evolved due to con ‡uence of di¤erent organizing paradigms and values rooted in each country's political organization, and shaped the degree of government Comparative political economics literature distinguishes between Anglo-Saxon capitalism (also known as "liberal market economies"), centered over economic e¢ ciency, and Rhenish capitalism (also called "coordinated market economies"), characterized by concerns over social welfare and collective action (Albert, 1993;  Hall and Soskice, 2001; Dore et al., 2003) . Britain and Ireland are classi…ed as belonging to the Anglo-Saxon type of capitalism due to their primary reliance on competitive markets and organizational hierarchy, and accordingly, employment protection regulations in these countries are very low. Northern European countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, and Denmark, are thought to function in the Rhenish type of capitalism, which is characterized by the prevalence of non-market, networkbased coordination. These countries have stricter employment protection regulations than countries with liberal market economies.
In Britain, development of Anglo-Saxon managerial capitalism mirrored that of the U.S. in 1920s by extending control to managers; however, managers in UK, keeping traditional social class distance, were far removed from the production ‡oor, thus yielding signi…cant control to shop ‡oor supervisors (Dore et al., 2003) . This led to increased organizing and strengthening of bargaining power by production workers, and by the 1960s national productivity and competitiveness had severely declined due to massive increases in strikes and labor con ‡ict. This prompted drastic reforms to reduce the in ‡uence of organized labor, dismantle employment protection regulations, and make it easier for …rms to …re employees (O'Sullivan, 2003). As a result, lifelong employment was replaced by careers marked by labor market mobility.
On the other hand, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden have supported the institution of codetermination, which ensures worker representation on the supervisory boards of …rms and encourages workers and management to cooperate in planning and addressing changes in direction and nature of business. State support for non-market coordination provides workers increased involvement in decision-making and allows resolution of con ‡ict within organizations. Rhenish capitalism often results in a high degree of employment protection, which in turn leads to comparatively long periods of employment tenure. Development of labor relations in France re ‡ects another variation of institutional in ‡uence on organization of production. Although state has always played a central role in ownership and control of business enterprise, as in Britain, workers and unions have been removed from corporate resource allocation decisions, regardless of state-mandated creation of work councils and pro-union incentives to encourage collaborative coordination, known as the "Aurux Laws" of the 1980s (O'Sullivan, 2003) . While the French were not able to achieve the same level of labor-management collaboration as in Rhenish forms of capitalism; nonetheless, the system for social democracy has ensured higher protection for employees than Anglo-Saxon forms of capitalism.
Proponents of Rhenish capitalism argue that strict employment regulations encourage …rm-speci…c investment by employees, increased training by employers, and greater involvement of employees in the workplace democracy. On the other hand, critics of Rhenish capitalism point out lower unemployment in Anglo-Saxon economies and blame labor market rigidities created by labor regulations that prevent …rms from quickly adjusting to market ‡uctuations.
In this paper we provide systematic evidence that is consistent with the view that …rms organize in corporate groups partly to o¤set external labor market rigidities that are imposed by employment protection regulations. We proceed to discuss how corporate groups are de…ned in the context of this paper, and how our de…nition relates to alternative de…nitions that the literature has previously proposed.
Corporate Groups
Corporate groups are an integral part of the economic landscape in the European Union (EU). The conceptualization of a corporate group in academic literature has been varied. Since Le¤ (1978) Several previous studies explain corporate group structure as resulting from ine¢ cient institutional environments and emphasize bene…ts that a¢ liate …rms gain from being part of a corporate group, such as access to capital, information, and labor. Mahmood and Mitchell (2004) and Chang, Chung and Mahmood (2006) determine that groups facilitate innovation where institutional infrastructure is weak. Belenzon et al. (2010 …nd that in European corporate groups, ‡exibility with …nancial resources a¤ects both the incentives to form groups and their innovative performance. Khanna and Yafeh (2005) suggest that a¢ liates reduce overall uncertainty through risk sharing within a corporate group. Especially in the context of labor markets, Khanna and Palepu (1997) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) suggest e¢ ciency of groups in recruiting and internally allocating talent. Chang and Hong (2000) also observe that Korean business group a¢ liates draw from internally developed pools of managers to o¤set the underdeveloped external markets for managerial talent. In the context of developed economies, the corporate group literature has focused on the "pyramidal groups," their formal ownership structure, and the darker side of groups within developed economies, such as expropriation of minority shareholders by dominant owners (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006) . We take a di¤erent stand by focusing on the institutional void explanation and propose that ine¢ cient external labor markets in Europe promote the formation of corporate groups.
We contend that corporate groups in Europe have an advantage in redeploying labor for two reasons: …rst, the legal provision that allows penalty-free transfers of labor among a¢ liates, and second, internal coordination of labor adjustment which avoids involuntary dismissals. Our discussions and consultations with European labor law experts and HR executives have further validated the utility of this provision for the purpose of unfettered mobility of personnel between a¢ liates of a corporate group. Second, internal coordination of labor allows groups to manage adjustments of labor across its a¢ liates with less reliance on external labor markets. For example, if an a¢ liated …rm A and a standalone …rm B are both hit with a negative shock that requires cutting back on employment, …rm A can utilize the group's internal market to place employees in an a¢ liate where a positive shock has increased demand for labor, thus avoiding involuntary dismissal costs, while standalone …rm B does not have that option and must let go of its employees and incur various dismissal costs. The internal coordination capability bolstered by the legal provision provide corporate groups an advantage in countries with strict employment protection regulations and in industries where frequent adjustments of labor are needed.
While business scholarship has devoted considerable e¤ort to understanding the economic consequences of groups, their emergence, and their prevalence, our work provides more general implications for large organizations in developed countries. This is because European corporate groups in many respects "obviously resemble the American conglomerates" (Le¤, 1978, p. 664 ). Using a¢ liates as a window into the internal structure of complex and large organizations in Europe is likely to have generalizable implications for large American …rms. This is important because division-level data is not systematically available for American conglomerates, which makes it impossible to compare standalone …rms to divisions with similar characteristics.
Equivalent European "divisions,"on the other hand, are typically incorporated legal entities which are visible to researchers and comparable to standalone …rms. Speci…cally in the context of the present paper, identifying the conditions under which large organizations are more likely to emerge due to ILM considerations (i.e., where corporate a¢ liation is more likely) should be also relevant for better understanding the relative prevalence of large American corporations.
Related Literature
Traditionally, the literature distinguishes between two types of labor market institutions: internal labor markets, which operate inside …rms/organizations, and external labor markets, which operate across organizations. Workers search for jobs that can pay them higher wages, while employers search for workers who can perform tasks more e¢ ciently. Under natural conditions, the only stable allocation of workers to jobs involves positive assortative matching: the ablest workers are matched with the best jobs, and the least able workers are matched with the worst jobs (Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985) . Well-functioning labor market institutions ensure that this e¢ cient allocation of workers to jobs is rapidly achieved (Borjas, 2002) . However, employment regulations can substantially restrict the e¤ectiveness of external labor markets in achieving an optimal allocation of workers to jobs, thus giving rise to internal labor markets to organize employment relationships and determine allocation of labor within a …rm.
The literature identi…es di¤erent advantages …rms can gain from managing their labor internally. First, …rms can increase incentives for …rm-speci…c investment by employees by insulating them from external ‡uctuations and providing opportunities for internal career paths (Doeringer and Piore, 1985; Holmstrom, 1994a, 1994b; Bertrand, 2004; Wang and Barney, 2006) . Due to di¢ culty of designing complete employment contracts, once worker wages are negotiated and set upon her entry into a …rm, …rms utilize informal agreements or relational contracting to govern the employment relationship (Macneil, 1985; Baker et al., 1994a Baker et al., , 1994b Levin, 2003; Bertrand, 2004) . Informal wage-shielding agreements keep wages stable relative to external market dynamics and employees are motivated by non-contractible promises for promotions and other rewards, all of which deem credible only through relational contracting in the absence of formal contracts. Thus, …rms can strategically in ‡uence employee e¤ort and …rm-speci…c investment through credible non-contractible promises within their internal labor markets. Increased …rm-speci…c investment by employees can enhance productivity and create opportunities for expansion (Penrose, 1959) . Second, internal mobility of labor facilitates transfer of tacit knowledge and expansion of social capital, activities critical for …rm performance and growth (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Burt, 1992) . Third, …rms with more internal reallocation options can potentially attract better talent at lower cost relative to …rms that cannot project that level of stability (Doeringer and Piore, 1985; Prendergast, 1993) .
Despite the large theoretical literature on internal labor markets, empirical research on the topic is limited Understanding conditions under which ILM emerge provides insight into when an ILM becomes a strategically important function of a …rm. While there are many ways ILM may provide signi…cant advantages over external labor markets even when labor regulations are relatively low, we argue that the potential advantages of internal labor markets should be more pronounced in environments where regulations are more severe.
We do not directly examine the di¤erent mechanisms by which ILM impart advantage to …rm outcomes in this paper. Instead, we focus on the wider question of whether increased labor adjustment costs due to labor regulations contribute to the creation of internal labor markets, especially in conditions where frequent adjustment of labor is necessary. However, we provide additional tests exploiting variation in industry task routines and …rm-speci…c training in the hope of highlighting potential strategic functioning of internal labor markets that would be helpful to guide future research in this …eld.
Data
We construct our sample from the Bureau van Dijk's (BvDEP) Amadeus …nancial database, which provides a wide and representative coverage of both private and public companies in Europe. BvDEP standardizes …nancial items across the various countries' …ling regulations and captures a wide range of …rm sizes. In this paper we exploit cross-sectional variation, such as employment and sales, across …rms, industries, and countries. Our data include three main sections, which we describe in detail below: ownership, country measures of labor regulations, and industry measures of labor turnover.
Ownership
Our dataset relies on detailed ownership links between European …rms from the 2007 version of Amadeus.
In this section, we explain our methodology for constructing the data and describe our sample. Amadeus provides information on equity links between …rms in Europe. For these inter-…rm dyadic ownership links, of …rm B, and …rm B owns 50% of …rm C, then …rm A has a 25% ownership link to C.
We de…ne a corporate group as a collection of at least two legally distinct …rms in which one of them is a controlling ultimate shareholder, where control is identi…ed according to the equity links described above.
A …rm is classi…ed as a group a¢ liate if: i) the …rm has a controlling parent company (it is a subsidiary), or ii) it is a parent company of another …rm (it has a subsidiary), or iii) it has the same controlling shareholder as at least one other …rm. 4 
Country Employment Regulations
Our main measure of country labor regulation is the OECD employment dismissal protection index for the 1998-2008 period. We refer to this index as employment protection. This index measures how di¢ cult it is to dismiss workers across countries. It includes di¤erent procedural inconveniences, severance pay, and overall di¢ culty of dismissal for economic and performance reasons. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating stricter regulations. We use the average annual dismissal protection index for each country in our sample. There is wide variation in dismissal protection across countries, from highly protected countries like Greece (3.11) and Spain (3.01), to least-protected countries like the Great Britain (1.07) and Switzerland (1.60). 5 Besides dismissal regulations, we utilize the OECD's data on country's labor expenditures (labor expenditures over GDP) to measure employment protection. Labor expenditures are di¤erent ways countries can protect employees from dismissals. Instead of letting …rms internalize the costs of turnover themselves, countries tax employers and provide bene…ts, such as unemployment insurance, from a common pool. The main di¤erence between labor expenditures and dismissal regulations is that …rms bear costs of the former regardless of whether they dismiss employees, while the latter apply to each dismissal occurrence. Examining labor expenditures is important because it provides a useful test of the ILM mechanism. We expect no e¤ect for employment expenditures because this protection is not speci…c to labor mobility across external or internal markets. There is wide variation in country spending on labor expenditures. Denmark (4.15%) spent the largest share on labor market expenditures, while the UK (0.58%) spent the smallest share of its GDP.
Interestingly, there is a very low correlation between dismissal protection and labor expenditures (0.07).
We utilize several alternative country measures which we use mostly as robustness to the OECD em- The second measure is ‡exibility in hiring and …ring workers. This measure is from the Executive Opinion survey (2008-2009), which is administrated by the World Economic Forum to collect country-speci…c information on local business executives'perceptions on labor regulations. The index ranges from hiring and …ring decisions being ‡exibly determined by employers (1) to being strictly constrained by regulations (7).
Our …nal regulation measure is …ring costs from the World Bank's Doing Business report (2009). This is a direct measure of the costs associated with dismissal in the form of number of weeks of wages paid as severance to dismissed employees. Table 1 presents the values of the above measures by country. 6 
Industry Employment Measures
We follow the methodology …rst used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and rank industries according to their level of labor turnover. We use U.S. data for ranking industries because the U.S. market is probably the least regulated market in the developed world; thus, …ring and hiring decisions are not likely to be signi…cantly a¤ected by U.S.-speci…c employment regulations. Additionally, groups are less common in the U.S., so U.S. labor turnover makes a good substitute for turnover without options for group ILM. Lastly, U.S. industry data is separate from European …rms, but major industries are structurally similar, so a U.S. industry's labor turnover is likely to be a good measure of that industry's turnover in Europe. We make two main assumptions on the nature of the industry measures: the …rst is that structural reasons (as opposed, for example, to local demand and supply conditions) explain why some industries have higher labor turnover than others, and the second is that these di¤erences persist across countries.
Our main industry variable is labor turnover. We construct labor turnover for each industry using an- mechanism. The …rst is how routine tasks are, and the second is the importance of …rm-speci…c training.
We use these measures later in the econometric analysis to split the sample between industries that rank high and low on these measures, and explore the sensitivity of the regulation-turnover e¤ect for the di¤erent industry subsamples being used.
Task non-routineness. We create a measure for how routine tasks are in the industry, based on the importance of making decisions and solving problems in various occupations within an industry. We follow 
Descriptive Statistics
Our estimation sample includes …rms for which we have non-missing sales for 2006 or the most recent year available and non-missing ownership information based on 2007 ownership structure. Later in the paper we report robustness checks for alternative restrictions of the estimation sample. Countries in our sample have di¤erent reporting requirements for small …rms, which may result in underreporting of small …rms in certain countries, but reporting should not vary systematically within countries. Our results are robust to cross-country variation in reporting requirements, because our empirical approach relies on the interaction of industry and country measures and controls for country-and industry-level e¤ects. ; b s (t) is the share of employment in six-digit occupation in an industry s; ( ,t) is the employment share of occupations (6-digit SOC 2010) in task t;
is the importance of problem-solving for occupation . million median). Our sample …rms belong to 68,137 unique groups. The average group has a total of 4 a¢ liates (with a 90th percentile of 6). The average group holds around $1 billion in assets; however, this seems to be driven by groups at the highest end of the distribution, since the median is $10 million, and the 90th percentile is $271 million. Table 3 presents summary statistics separately for a¢ liates and standalone …rms. A¢ liates tend to be larger in terms of sales, total assets, and the number of employees, but quite similar to standalone …rms in terms of age. Interestingly, we …nd that a¢ liates have much higher turnover than standalone …rms, consistent with the basic premise of this paper of higher labor adjustment costs for standalone …rms.
Econometric Speci…cation
We investigate the e¤ect of country labor regulations on group a¢ liation by testing whether corporate groups substitute for more constrained external labor markets. We focus on a speci…c mechanism through which group membership can mitigate market frictions-internal labor markets. 9 If groups form as a substitute for highly regulated labor markets, we should observe a higher probability of group a¢ liation for …rms that operate in industries where …ring and hiring are frequent, that is, industries where labor turnover is high. In these industries, government labor regulations should matter the most.
Thus, consistent with the ILM theory, we expect that the di¤erence in the probability of group a¢ liation between industries with high relative to low labor turnover would be higher in countries with high employment regulations than in countries with low employment regulations. We estimate a Linear Probability Model for a¢ liation probability. The dependent variable is a dummy that receives the value of unity for …rms that are a¢ liated with a corporate group, and zero for standalone …rms.
The econometric speci…cation is given as Pr(Af f iliate = 1) i = 1 Sales i + 2 EmpReg c T urnover j + 3 Industry sales share jc + ' j + c + i (1) i denotes …rms -the unit of observation, Sales i is annual sales of …rm, EmpReg c is the employment regulation for country c, T urnover j is a measure of labor turnover for industry j, ' j and c are complete sets of industry and country dummies, and i is an iid error term. Similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998), we control for the share of industry sales in each country: Industry sales share jc -the share of total sales of industry j (in which the focal …rm operates) in country c: This measure is computed using all …rms in the complete sample where we make no restrictions on sales. 9 In a related paper and using a similar setting, examine the e¤ects of country …nancial development on propensity of …rms to organize in corporate groups by exploiting the industry-level di¤erences in dependency on external …nancing. To determine the relationship between …nancing and labor mechanisms, we examined the correlations between the key measures and controlled for …nancing country-industry e¤ects in our main speci…cation. We …nd no signi…cant correlation between measures of country labor regulation and levels of …nancial development (-0.35), between industry-level measures of labor turnover and dependence on external …nancing (-0.03), and between labor and …nancing sets of country-industry interactions (-0.05). As well, the results for labor and …nancing e¤ects remain robust when both are included, thus suggesting independence of each mechanism in a¤ecting the propensity of …rms to organize in groups. Taken together, these two papers emphasize the importance of internal markets in shaping …rm boundaries.
Consistent with the hypothesis that the di¤erence in share of a¢ liated …rms between high-and lowlabor turnover industries would be larger in countries with higher employment regulation, we expect b 2 > 0: The interpretation of b 2 can be easily explained as follows. Taking the …rst di¤erence in probability of a¢ liation with respect to labor turnover, holding …xed country employment regulation, yields P c = b 2 EmpReg c T urnover. Next, taking the di¤erence in P c between high and low country labor regulation yields P = b 2 EmpReg T urnover. b 2 thus measures how much higher the likelihood of a¢ liation is at a high level of industry labor turnover with respect to an industry with low labor turnover, when it is located in a country with a high level of country regulation rather than in one with the low level of development.
In all regressions we report P , where industry and country di¤erences are computed by moving from the lowest to the highest quartile. Table 5 presents the estimation results for the interaction between country labor regulation and industry labor turnover. The results are consistent with the ILM hypothesis ( 2 > 0). Column 1 includes an interaction between OECD index of country employment protection and industry labor turnover. As expected, the coe¢ cient estimate is positive and is highly signi…cant. Based on this estimate, the di¤erential e¤ect of ILM, P; is 4.2 percentage points. This means that the di¤erence between the highest and lowest deciles of industry labor turnover rises by 4.2 percentage points, or 20 percent of the sample average share of group a¢ liates, when moving from the lowest to the highest country employment regulation.
Estimation Results
The E¤ect of ILM on Group A¢ liation
Column 2 adds the OECD index of labor expenditures. The measure of country labor expenditures is not related to …rm-speci…c …ring or hiring decisions, and thus should not a¤ect group a¢ liation. As expected, the coe¢ cient estimate of labor expenditures is zero.
Columns 3 to 5 present the estimation results for the alternative country regulation variables: rigidity of employment, ‡exibility in hiring and …ring, and …ring costs. In all cases we …nd a positive and signi…cant interaction term with industry labor turnover. For the …rst two measures, the estimated di¤erential e¤ect is almost twice as large as the estimated e¤ect for labor turnover.
Lastly, in our main speci…cation, the unit of observation is the individual …rm. Column 6 checks the sensitivity of our results for unity of observation selection by estimating a collapsed model where the unit of observation is country-industry. For each country and industry, we calculated the average share of a¢ liates and collapsed the data to the country-industry level, resulting in 3,457 observations for 288 three-digit SIC industries in 15 countries (some countries have fewer industries represented than others). This estimation yields similar coe¢ cient estimates on the country-industry interaction term.
Alternative Industry Measures
We proceed by examining how our results change when using di¤erent industry measures that could potentially inform on the speci…c functions of ILM mechanism. Table 6 presents the estimation results. Column 1 includes industry involuntary turnover. We expect our results to be especially strong for involuntary separations, because these are most likely to be a¤ected by dismissal regulations. Our results are consistent with this expectation. This is an important result because it rules out an alternative explanation where industry turnover is simply driven by short-term jobs which are likely to have a high turnover rate because they do not o¤er real career opportunities to employees.
Columns 2 and 3 distinguish between managerial turnover and production-worker turnover. We …nd that our results are mostly driven by managerial turnover. This …nding suggests that …rm-speci…c knowledge and skills may be more important for ILM considerations than generic interchangeable labor. To further explore this interpretation, we utilize industry-level measures of task routine and the amount of on-the-job training provided by employers. Columns 5 and 6 examine how the turnover-regulation coe¢ cient varies by our measure of task routineness. By splitting the sample by high-and low-routine industries, we …nd a much stronger turnover-regulation interaction e¤ect for the non-routine industries. Columns 6 and 7 split the sample by high and low training. The coe¢ cient estimates in the two subsamples are essentially the same;
however, the estimate is more precise in the high-training industries. Taken together, our …ndings show that the ILM mechanism is stronger for managerial mobility, and in industries where worker discretion is large.
These …ndings highlight decision-making responsibilities, rather than low-skill temporary jobs, in the way in which ILM in ‡uences …rm group a¢ liation decisions.
Firm and Group Characteristics
To further test our prediction, we exploit variations in …rm and group characteristics. Table 7 presents the estimation results.
Starting with …rm characteristics, we examine how the turnover-regulation interaction varies by …rm employment. Large standalone …rms are likely to have their own internal labor markets and therefore should be less sensitive to country regulations as compared to small standalone …rms that have limited employment pools to draw from when readjusting labor. Thus, we expect the e¤ect of ILM to be more pronounced when comparing smaller standalone …rms with a¢ liated …rms of similar size. Columns 1 and 2 con…rm this prediction when splitting the sample by …rms with above and below 100 employees. Results are robust to alternative employment cuto¤s.
We proceed to examine how our results vary by group characteristics. Columns 3-11 present the estimation results for distinguishing between groups that are small or large, diversi…ed or specialized, family held or widely held, domestic versus multinationals. There are several interesting …ndings worth pointing out.
First, we expect our results to be especially strong when comparing standalone …rms to a¢ liates of large and diversi…ed groups. Larger groups have more internal resources to maintain steady growth and o¤er less risky employment prospects to their workforce. Diversi…ed groups can provide an additional insurance from external business ‡uctuations and redistribute labor as needed. The results support this view. We split groups into three size categories based on total assets; we classify groups as specialized if all group a¢ liates operate in a single three-digit SIC code industry, and diversi…ed if group a¢ liates operate in at least two distinct three-digit SIC code industries. We estimate the turnover-regulation e¤ect separately for each subsample of group a¢ liates. In each estimation, we compare all standalone …rms that the respective set of group-a¢ liated …rms. The estimated coe¢ cient on the country-industry interaction is much larger for the samples of large and diversi…ed group a¢ liates than for specialized group a¢ liates (columns 3-7).
Second, family-owned groups, which account for 5 percent of the groups in our sample, are likely to have di¤erent considerations of internal promotions than widely-held groups. Family-controlled groups may appoint managers to key positions not by merit but by family relation, which can reduce opportunities and incentives for high-quality personnel (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006 ). We do not …nd large di¤erences in the magnitude of the e¤ect for the di¤erent samples of family-held and widely-held …rms (columns 8-9).
Lastly, we separately compare domestic and multinational group a¢ liates with standalone …rms. All a¢ liates in a domestic group operate within a single country, while multinational groups own a¢ liates in more than one country in our sample. The estimated coe¢ cients on the country-industry interaction term are large and positive in both subsamples, but the coe¢ cient for the domestic group a¢ liates is more signi…cant (columns 10-11). We …nd similar results when using alternative measures of group internationalization, such as group a¢ liate-sales or assets concentration by country.
Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks for the e¤ect of ILM on group a¢ liation. Table 8 presents the estimation results for alternative ways of constructing industry labor turnover and for alternative restrictions on the …nal estimation sample.
Non-linearity in industry ranking. We begin by exploring the sensitivity of our results to non-linear e¤ects of industry turnover (column 1). We break up industry turnover into quartiles and interact each quartile with country labor regulations in order to check for non-linear industry e¤ects, as well as to have a more . We follow the same procedure to determine the industry rate of turnover using these di¤erent datasets.
The correlations between our primary industry labor turnover measure and these alternative measures are 0.36 and 0.35, respectively. The same pattern of results continues to hold when using these alternative measures of industry turnover.
Removing outliers and …rms with missing employment information. The concern is that our results are sensitive to including very small or very large …rms in our estimation sample. We limit the estimation sample to …rms with a number of employees between the 1st and 99th percentile of the employment distribution to drop the smallest …rms that are usually not subject to employment protection regulations and largest …rms which are likely to have internal labor markets and thus less likely for their a¢ liation with other …rms to be a¤ected by the ILM considerations. The results hold for this sample as well (column 5). The e¤ect is also robust to including …rms with missing employment information (not reported).
Missing ownership information. In our analysis thus far we exclude …rms that do not have ownership information. We check the sensitivity of our results to dropping these …rms by including all …rms with missing ownership information as standalones and assume that …rms are not a¢ liated with groups, unless we have ownership information that indicates group membership. This procedure more than doubles the number of observations in our estimation sample. The results are robust to inclusion of …rms with no ownership information (column 6). Removing individual countries. Our last robustness check is to remove individual countries from the sample and re-estimate our model separately for each excluded country (not reported). This procedure allows us to examine whether a single country is driving our results. We con…rm that our results continue to hold. The estimate of the coe¢ cient on the interaction between industry labor turnover and country labor regulation is always positive and signi…cant. The di¤erential e¤ect varies from a low of 2.9 percent when
France is excluded, to a high of 6.2 percent when Great Britain is excluded (this constitutes about 14.2 percent of the sample average share of group a¢ liates when France is excluded and a much stronger e¤ect of 31.2 percent without Great Britain in the sample).
The Dynamics of Group A¢ liation
Thus far we have shown that the propensity of …rms to be a¢ liated with groups is larger where country regulations and industry turnover are jointly high. In this section we provide additional evidence of the dynamics of group a¢ liation by documenting patterns of changes in ownership structure.
We investigate how many of the …rms which we classify as standalones We proceed by examining di¤erent mechanisms through which …rms change a¢ liation status from standalone to group a¢ liate. We distinguish between …rms that became group a¢ liates by forming new groups, and …rms that became group a¢ liates by joining existing groups. We observe 31,823 standalone …rms in 2011 that are classi…ed as parent company with at least one subsidiary (this comprises 39.5% of all …rms that changed a¢ liation). Next, we classify …rms that join existing groups by using the 2011 ownership structure and by identifying those that were acquired between 2007 and 2011 using Bureau van Dijk's Zephyr database, or listed as subsidiaries in the 2011 ownership database. We determine that 48,683 …rms joined existing groups between 2007 and 2011 (this represent 60.5% of …rms that changed ownership).
We further examine the types of standalone …rms that become a¢ liated with a corporate group between 2007 and 2011 by isolating small standalone …rms and distinguishing them by their growth prior to a¢ liation (2005) (2006) (2007) . In countries where employment protection regulations restrict labor adjustments, smaller standalone …rms on growth trajectory may bene…t more from becoming a part of a group and tapping into its internal labor market, especially in industries with higher labor turnover. Table 9 shows that out of standalone …rms with fewer than 50 employees in 2007, a larger share of high-growth …rms are likely to become a¢ liated with a corporate group than low-growth …rms (8.5 and 6.5 percent, respectively), and …rms are more likely to join an existing group than form a new one.
We next examine whether the change in a¢ liation is skewed towards industries and countries where both turnover and regulation are jointly signi…cant. Table 10 presents the estimation results. The within-…rm results are consistent with the ILM prediction: changes toward a¢ liation are higher in countries with stricter employment regulation and higher industry turnover (column 1). The results also hold when estimating separately for …rms that formed new groups (column 2) and …rms that joined existing groups (column 3).
Then we limit the estimation to small standalones. While the results for all small standalone …rms with fewer than 50 employees are consistent with results for all standalone …rms (column 4), group a¢ liation is driven mostly by high-growth …rms (columns 5 and 6). This suggests that smaller …rms on growth trajectory become a¢ liated with groups to take advantage of internal labor markets when external labor market frictions are high.
Direct Evidence on Intra-…rm Managerial Mobility
In his seminal article, Le¤ (1978) argues that the redeployment of high-level management across business lines is an important advantage of group a¢ liation. It has long been recognized that inputs such as "honesty and trustworthy competence on the part of high-level managers"are inherently di¢ cult to market e¢ ciently (Le¤, 1978 , p. 666) and that "it is self-evident that such management cannot be hired in the market-place" (Penrose, 1959, p. 41) . Therefore, groups can mitigate the problems associated with managerial selection by creating internal markets for managerial talent. Since …rm-speci…c knowledge and know-how are di¢ cult to acquire on and perspectives in sense-making and formulating …rm strategy. To our knowledge, we are …rst to provide direct systematic information on patterns on intra-…rm managerial mobility while distinguishing between movements which are internal and external to the group.
We document the prevalence of internal labor markets for top managers as follows. Our data provides information on …rms' upper management, so we select managers for whom we have complete employment information between 2002 and 2007 to determine managerial mobility patterns (Belenzon and Patacconi, 2012 Table 11 a pattern of higher within-group managerial mobility in larger groups and in countries with higher labor protection. We use the share of within-group moves to test the di¤erence between managerial moves in countries of high and low employment protection (by median). Consistent with the ILM theory, we expect the share of intra-group mobility to be higher when a group operates in countries with high employment protection, and this is what we …nd.
The comparison-of-means test shows a consistently higher share of internal moves for a¢ liate managers in countries with high employment protection. The di¤erence grows with the size of the group: for small groups the di¤erence in means is 0.8%, while managers in largest groups move internally on average 12.9% more in countries with high employment protection than in countries with low employment protection, and the di¤erence is highly signi…cant.
Further analysis shows that diversi…ed groups (whose a¢ liates generate sales from more than one threedigit SIC industry) and multinational groups (in which at least one of the a¢ liates operates in a country di¤erent from the rest) have higher internal mobility of managers than specialized and domestic groups (not reported). The pattern holds when we use the share of internal moves out of all managers, including those that did not move and stayed employed with the same …rm for …ve years. These patterns provide a direct evidence of active internal labor markets in corporate groups, especially when external labor market frictions are higher. Groups take advantage of internal labor markets in countries with higher external labor mobility restrictions and actively reallocate managerial resources.
Conclusion
This paper provides a detailed empirical examination of the e¤ect of country labor regulations on corporate group a¢ liation in West European countries. We argue that corporate groups have an advantage in readjusting their labor through internal labor market coordination, aided by a provision granted to corporate groups that allows their intra-group labor mobility to be exempt from country labor laws. This provision means that while in some countries standalone …rms are "penalized" for modifying their labor force using external labor markets, group a¢ liates can tap into the group internal labor markets to freely adjust their labor.
To the extent that labor regulations pose a signi…cant constraint on labor allocation and reallocation, we expect a greater share of economic production to be organized in corporate groups, especially when country constraints are signi…cant, and where the need to readjust labor force is high.
Our results strongly con…rm the presence of an ILM mechanism through which country employment regulations positively a¤ect the formation of corporate groups. The ILM is especially strong for managerial, rather than production-worker, mobility, and in industries where the use of worker discretion is high. We complement our indirect approach with direct evidence on managerial mobility. Lastly, we complement our …ndings with direct evidence on managerial mobility, and show that internal mobility becomes more likely than external mobility as country employment regulations increase.
More generally, our work contributes to understanding the strategic role of internal labor markets. How internal labor markets a¤ect …rms' competitive advantage in product and technology markets remains a challenge for future research. Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions that examine the effect of employment regulation protection levels on corporate group affiliation. The estimation is cross-sectional (at the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year that data is available. Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation sample. Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of industry labor turnover with respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 10th percentile level of employment protection rather than in one at the 90th percentile level of employment protection. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by country. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions that examine the effect of employment regulation protection levels on corporate group affiliation by alternative industry measures. Column 1 reports estimates from using involuntary dismissal turnover measure. Columns 2 and 3 use managerial and production worker turnover measures. Columns 4 and 5 report estimates from 4th (highly non-routine) and 1st quartile (highly routine) distribution of industries. Columns 6 and 7 split the sample by 1st and 4th quartile of industry-level training, respectively. The estimation is cross-sectional (at the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year that data is available. Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation sample. Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of industry labor turnover with respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 10th percentile level of employment protection rather than in one at the 90th percentile level of employment protection. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by country. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Notes: This table reports the results of Linear Probability Model regressions examining how the effect of countries' employment protection regulations on corporate group affiliation varies by firm and group characteristics. The estimation is cross-sectional (at the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year that data is available. Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation sample. Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of industry labor turnover with respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 10th percentile level of employment protection rather than in one at the 90th percentile level of employment protection. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by country. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Notes: This table examines the robustness of the effect of employment protection regulations on group affiliation. The estimation is crosssectional (at the firm level) and is based on the 2007 ownership structure. Sales data is for 2006 or the most recent year available. Industry Sales Share is three-digit industry sales as a share of total country sales, computed over all firms in the estimation sample. Differential in affiliation probability measures how much higher the likelihood of affiliation is at the 90th percentile level of industry labor turnover with respect to an industry at the 10th percentile level when it is located in a country at the 10th percentile level of employment protection rather than in one at the 90th percentile level of employment protection. Columns 3 and 4 use alternative industry turnover measures calculated using data from all firms in Amadeus (1997 Amadeus ( -2007 and Compustat . Column 5 drops firms below 1st and above 99th percentile of employment distribution. Column 6 includes firms with missing ownership information. Column 7 excludes firms in industries with higher share of employees with labor union contracts (at 95th percentile and above). Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by country. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
